Autonomy for Changing Selves by Pettigrew, Richard
Autonomy for Changing Selves∗
Richard Pettigrew
March 24, 2021
Our values change. What we value, want, desire, prefer, and how much; for
nearly everyone, these will be different at different times in their life. These
changes can be gradual or abrupt; they can be long-lasting or short-lived;
and they can be induced by forces outside yourself or they can come from
within or they can have no specific catalyst at all. Such preference change
raises a number of questions for our theorising about rational choice, and
these have been discussed at length. In §2 and §3, I’ll outline two of these
questions along with some of the putative solutions that have been pro-
posed. But preference change also raises questions for our theorising about
autonomy, and these have hardly been considered at all. In §4, I’ll outline
three problems for personal autonomy; and in §5, I’ll outline one problem
for political autonomy. In §6, I conclude.
1 Examples
To focus the mind, let’s begin with some examples of the different ways in
which our preferences might change.1
A gradual, long-lasting shift with no specific cause. For instance, the British
playwright Alan Bennett talks of the “dreary safari” from the left to the
right of the political spectrum that some undertake as they grow older.2
Others move the other way, becoming more radical as they age. And, for
some, the shift may not be political at all. They might value the life of
contemplation when they are young but come to prefer the life of action
∗To appear in Routledge Handbook of Autonomy edited by Ben Colburn.
1In what follows, I’ll talk of preferences, values, desires, and wants interchangeably.
We have conative attitudes, which encode how we’d like the world is be, and these are
represented variously by preference, values, and so on. Nothing I say will turn on any
distinction between different types of conative attitudes or their representation.
2Quoted in ‘Alan Bennett launches fierce attack on private education’ The Guardian,
17th June 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/jun/17/alan-bennett-attack-
private-education-lecture-wrong
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later in their life, or they might favour a close-knit group of friends in their
youth, but a larger collection of acquaintances when they are elderly.
An abrupt, long-lasting change caused by something outside the agent. For in-
stance, many who are diagnosed with a serious illness change their values,
perhaps because of the jolt administered by the news, perhaps because it al-
lows them to see aspects of society differently as an outsider to the norm of
health on which it is founded.3 And of course there are many other major
life experiences that might have a similar effect: losing a loved one; being
betrayed by a friend; reading a profound work of philosophy or literature;
and so on.
An abrupt, long-lasting change caused by a consequence of the agent’s own choice.
For instance, a person who values spending time with friends and devoting
themselves to volunteering with a charity, and has little time for family,
might choose to become a parent, reasonably confident that, when their
child is born, their preferences will switch, and they’ll value time spent
with their family more.4
A gradual, long-lasting shift caused by a consequence of the agent’s own choice.
For instance, the person who values self-direction and disvalues confor-
mity, but joins the police force knowing that people who do so nearly al-
ways assimilate by adjusting their values to those prevalent in their work-
place, and for the police that involves becoming more conformist.5 Or the
person who moves to a country with a different dominant set of values and
who assimilates to those.
An abrupt, short-lived change caused by a consequence of the agent’s own choice.
The most common examples of this are cases of temptation.6 It’s 1pm. I’ve
been working all morning. I’d like to spend five minutes checking social
media. But I know that, if I log on, I’ll want to spend thirty minutes on
there—that is, I know my preferences will change. But I also know they’ll
revert to my original preferences whenever I log off—so I know the change
will be short-lived. This is a reasonably trivial case, but there are other more
significant ones with the same structure: a person who is tempted to be un-
faithful to their partner when they’re in the presence of a particular person
to whom they’re attracted; people who enjoy gambling, but who dramati-
cally increase the amount of money they’re willing to lose the second they
sit down at the poker table; and so on.
3See (Carel, 2014; Carel et al., 2016).
4See (Ullmann-Margalit, 2006; Bykvist, 2006; Paul, 2014; Pettigrew, 2019a).
5See (Bardi et al., 2014) for empirical work on how and when such preference changes
happen.












Figure 1: The standard temptation case
2 Temptation
Cases of temptation share a structure.7 There are three outcomes: o1, o2, o3.
In the social media example from above:
• o1 is the outcome in which I go on social media for only five minutes;
• o2 is the outcome in which I go on for thirty minutes;
• o3 is the outcome in which I don’t go on at all.
And there are three times:
• t1: 1pm—the initial time, when I am deciding whether to log on;
• t2: 1:05pm—if I have logged on, I will be choosing whether to log off
at this time;
• t3: 1:31pm—I’ll have logged off either way, whether I stay on for five
minutes or thirty.
I face a decision D1 at time t1—log on or don’t. And, if I log on, I face a
decision D2 at t1—log off or don’t. The table below gives my preferences
over the three options at the three times, depending on whether or not I do
log on.
Log on Don’t log on
t1 o1 > o3 > o2 o1 > o3 > o2
t2 o2 > o1 > o3 o1 > o3 > o2
t3 o1 > o3 > o2 o1 > o3 > o2
Figure 1 illustrates the decisions I face.
7My presentation here owes much to (Thoma, 2018).
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As we can see, if I wish to get the outcome that, at 1pm, I most want (i.e., o1)
I must choose to log on. So our standard theory of rational choice seems to
tell us that, at 1pm, I’m rationally required to log on. But I know that I will
change my preferences once I have logged on, and rationality will require
me, at 1:05pm, not to log off and instead stay on for thirty minutes to get the
outcome I then value most (i.e., o2). But then, after a series of two rational
choices, I’ll end up with an outcome that, at time 1pm and at 1:31pm, I
least want. And indeed, there seems to be no rational way to obtain the
outcome I value most at 1pm—that is, there seems to be no rational way to
resist temptation. This is often thought to pose a problem for the standard
theory of rational choice, which says that I should do what I most prefer at
each time.
Decision theorists have proposed a host of solutions, or partial solutions.
I’ll enumerate five here.8
First: the sophisticated choice approach.9 The key claim here is that, when you
face a decision at one time, you should take into account what you know
about how you will choose at future times, and you should choose at the
earlier time with that in mind. In decision theory, we are told to choose
the action with the best outcome or consequence. For one of the actions
available to me at t1—namely, logging on—its long-term outcome depends
on what decision I make at t2. If I choose not to log on at t1, then what I do
at t2 doesn’t matter; but if I choose to log on at t1, the outcome of that action
is determined by whether I choose at t2 to log off or to stay on. I predict that
I’ll choose at t2 according to the preferences I have at that time. So I predict
I’ll choose to stay on. So, at t1, I know that the outcome of logging on is in
fact o2, while the outcome of not logging on is o3. And since I prefer o3 to
o2 at t1, I should choose not to log on. Notice that this is a partial solution
to the problem for rational choice theory posed above. It explains how I
might rationally choose in a way that will not lead to the outcome that, at
t1, I consider worst. But it doesn’t explain how I might rationally choose in
a way that leads to the outcome I then consider best.
Second: the binding approach. According to this, you add a choice point
just before t1—let’s call it t0, or 12:59pm. At this time, you can choose to
add an app to your phone that limits your time on social media to five
minutes (decision D0). If you choose this, you still face the choice to log
on or not at t1, but at t2, if you have logged on, you no longer face the
choice whether to log off or not—the app decides that for you, and it logs
you off. Having introduced this new decision, you can now appeal to the
sophisticated choice approach. If you choose to install the app, then you
8For a much fuller treatment, see (Bermúdez, 2018); for an overview of that treatment,
see (Pettigrew, 2019b).




















Figure 2: The binding solution to the temptation case
know you’ll choose to log on at t1, since that leads you to the best outcome
that is available to you at that point, namely, o1-less-cost-of-app, and this
is the outcome you’ll secure. If you choose not to install it, you’ll choose
not to log on at t1, since you know that if you do log on, you won’t log
off at t2, and you’ll end up with outcome o2, which, at t1, you want less
than o3, which you’ll secure if you don’t log on. So, if you choose not to
install the app, you’ll end up with outcome o3. So, providing the time-
limiting app does not cost too much, and you prefer o1-less-cost-of-app to
o3, then applying sophisticated choice at t0 leads you to log on and enjoy
the five minutes on social media that the app allows. This is illustrated in
Figure 2 below. Again, notice this is only a partial solution to the problem
posed by temptation, since it explains how it is rational to choose actions
that result in o1-less-cost-of-app, rather than o1 itself, which is the preferred
outcome.
Third: the commitment approach.10 In standard decision theory, we represent
our agent as choosing between a set of available actions, and we conceive
of these as performed at a single specific time—the action of clicking the
button to log in to your social media account; the action of setting off to
the party where temptation awaits; and so on. On the two-tier approach,
there is still a set of available actions at each time. But sometimes there
is also a set of available plans or intentions or strategies or resolutions or
commitments between which you might choose. We conceive of these not
as performed at a specific time, but as laying out a schedule for what actions
10See (McClennen, 1990; Holton, 2009; Bratman, 2012).
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to choose at different times when faced with specific decision problems.
Thus, I might choose a plan that commits me to choosing to log on at t1,
and then log off at t2. If I choose this plan at t1 and then stick with it at t2, I
will obtain the outcome o1 that, at t1, I most want.
Of course, having enriched our set of options with these plans, we must
say which plan rationality requires us to choose at a given time; and then
we must explain why, having chosen one, rationality requires us to adhere
to it at a later time.
On one approach, rationality says that you must choose whichever plan
you will consider best at all times, if such exists; and then, at each time
the plan covers, you should do what it says at that time.11 The problem,
of course, is that, in cases of temptation such as we consider here, no such
plan exists: a plan to choose to log on at t1 and to log off at t2 is best by the
lights of your preferences at t1, but not by the lights of your preferences at
t2; a plan to log on and then not to log off at t2 is best at t2; but not t1; and a
plan not to log on at t1 isn’t best at either time.
Another approach, which is known as resolute choice, tells you to choose
at t1 whatever plan will get you what, at t1, you most prefer were you to
follow it to the letter at all times it covers; and then, at each time it covers,
you should follow it to the letter.12 The problem with this is that it seems to
rule out as irrational ever forming new preferences and acting upon them.
After all, as soon as a plan to cover your whole life is available, you will
choose the one that best satisfies your preferences at that time; and hence-
forth, you will be bound to follow that plan. Relatedly, it isn’t clear why
the dead hand of the past should have as tight a grip on your decisions as
this account demands.
Fourth: the group rationality approach. According to this, we should treat the
person who faces the decision to log on or not at t1 and the person who
might face the decision to log off or not at t2 as separate selves.13 They
are both part of the same person, namely, me; but they are distinct selves
with distinct preferences. Once we conceive of them like that, we can see
their decisions not as two decisions faced by one person, but as a single
decision made by one self and a different single decision made at a later
time by another, different self. Together, these selves form a group whose
members are making decisions individually, but in the service of the group
as a whole—akin to a group of artisans each working on a different com-
ponent of an elaborate clock that they are building together. And there are
a number of theories of group rationality that we might bring to bear on
11See (Gauthier, 1994).
12See (McClennen, 1990).
13See (Peleg & Yaari, 1973; Gold, 2018; Pettigrew, 2019a).
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the question of how individuals in such a group should choose. We might,
for instance, appeal to game theory, which tells us how two individuals
with different preferences should choose when they each face separate de-
cisions whose outcomes depend on the other individual’s choice. Or we
might appeal to voting theory, or other methods of judgment aggregation,
which tell us how to pool the preferences of the individuals in a group
to give the group’s preferences, and then we might choose on the basis of
those. Whichever approach we take, the idea is that, because the two selves
identify as part of a group or team devoted to choosing together, they can
rationally compromise and cooperate.
Fifth: the true self approach. According to this, we should distinguish be-
tween those preferences that issue from your ‘true self’ and those that issue
from some normatively less compelling source.14 The idea is that, in cases
of temptation, what you feel you want to do when under the influence of
the temptation does not reflect the preferences of your true self. Rather, it
issues from somewhere else. In the social media case above, my true self
wants to spend only five minutes online, but some more base urge drives
me to spend longer on there once I have logged on. According to this ap-
proach, my true preferences don’t change between t1 and t2. What seem
to be new preferences at t2 do not issue from my true self; because of this,
they have no normative force. Instead, rationality requires me to choose in
line with my true preferences. So, I should choose to log on at t1 and log
off at t2. If I don’t, I’m irrational.
3 Transformative experiences
Perhaps it’s because of the sort of examples that motivate our treatment
of temptation; perhaps it’s because in cases of temptation our preferences
change and then change back again after quite a short period of time and
only last so long as we’re in a particular situation, such as logged on to
social media or sitting at the poker table; but we are more enthusiastic to
support solutions that privilege our preferences at time t1 than those that
privilege t2 or even treat the two equally. But there are cases of chang-
ing preferences in which that is not the case. These are cases in which the
change is long-lasting, and in which the catalyst is not simply being in a
particular environment, but rather a profound change in your life. Some
have argued that this sort of preference change also challenges our theory
of rational choice.15
Again, let’s begin with an example. I am choosing whether or not to adopt
a child and become a parent. At the moment, my life is quite settled. I
14See (Mele, 2018; Thoma, 2018; Pettigrew, 2019a).
15See, for instance, (Ullmann-Margalit, 2006; Bykvist, 2006; Paul, 2014).
7
have a very close group of friends, whom I see regularly, and I spend much
of my free time helping to run an evening club for cognitively disabled
adults. At the moment, I prefer that life to the life I would lead as a par-
ent, where my time for these friends and this evening club would be much
reduced. But I know that, were I to adopt and become a parent, I’d value
doing that more. I’d come to love the child I adopt and I’d come to want
them to flourish so much that I’d prefer spending the majority of my time
ensuring their happiness to spending it with my friends or on my work
for the club. The experience of becoming a parent, like the experience of
moving to a new country, falling in love, or learning you have a terminal
illness, are what L. A. Paul (2014) calls transformative experiences. By having
them, they change core parts of who you are, including certain core values.
How, then, should I choose when faced with the adoption process or any
other decision on which one or more of the available actions might lead to a
transformative experience? Such decisions Edna Ullmann-Margalit (2006)
calls big decisions. Decision theory typically tells me to choose whichever
option I most prefer. But, relative to my child-free preferences, I prefer not
to become a parent, while relative to the preferences I would have if I were
to adopt, I prefer to be a parent. So when I choose the option I most pre-
fer, which set of preferences should I use? The ones I have at the point I
make the decision? The ones I have when the effects of the decision are
being felt? Some other preferences entirely? Or perhaps some combination
of these? On this question, you might think, standard decision theory is
silent. The challenge that such cases of preference change pose is how to
say something principled about them.
As in the case of temptation, a number of putative solutions have been
proposed, and indeed some resemble the solutions in that case.
First: the unchanging preferences solution.16 In some ways this resembles the
true self approach from above, for it also denies that there has been any
real change in the true preferences. But this time the reason is not that my
child-free or my potential parent preferences don’t issue from the true self,
it’s just that both are reflections of a single underlying preference that re-
mains the same throughout. To motivate the idea, think of someone who,
at twenty years old, prefers going on a rollercoaster to going on a vintage
steam train, while at ninety prefers the train. In this case, we might say
that their preferences haven’t changed: in both cases, they prefer doing
whatever gives them most physical pleasure; what has changed is what
gives them that. When they are young and the rollercoaster gives only the
rush of adrenaline and no physical discomfort, it is the rollercoaster; when
they are older and it makes them feel sick and faint and their chest feels
tight, it is the train. On the unchanging preferences solution, all appar-
16See (Stigler & Becker, 1977; Becker, 1998; Nagel, 1978).
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ent preference change is like this: the underlying preferences remain the
same; what changes are the features of the world that determine what spe-
cific outcomes will satisfy those preferences. In the case of the rollercoaster
and steam train, for instance, it is the physiology of the individual’s body.
One problem with this is that, in the case of adopting a child, it isn’t clear
what plays the role that physical pleasure plays in the rollercoaster exam-
ple: what is it exactly that I will steadfastly prefer throughout the change
wrought by becoming a parent that will lead me to want not to be a parent
before that change occurs but will lead me to want to be a parent after-
wards?
Second: the higher-order preference approach.17 According to this, when our
first-order preferences change, we should appeal to our higher-order pref-
erences to adjudicate. When I choose whether or not to adopt, and I see
that my current preferences are different from what they’ll be if I do adopt,
I should ask myself: which of these preferences would I prefer to have?
Do I prefer being someone who values my friendships and my work at the
evening club over raising a child? Or do I prefer being someone whose
first-order preferences run the other way? If the former, I should not adopt;
if the latter, I should. One problem with this suggestion is that my second-
order preferences often change in tandem with my first-order preferences.
At the moment, I prefer my current, child-free preferences; if I adopt, not
only will my first-order preferences change, but so will my second-order
preferences, and they’ll change so that they prefer the first-order prefer-
ences that I’ll then have. So the higher-order approach merely pushes the
problem back a step: to which second-order preferences should I appeal
when I make my decision? Another problem is similar to one that arises in
discussions of Frankfurt’s and Dworkin’s approaches to autonomy, which
also appeal to second-order preferences. Why should second-order prefer-
ences take normative priority? Why should we bring them into alignment
by changing our first-order preferences? Why not change our second-order
preferences?18
Third: the group rationality approach.19 This is very similar to the approach
of the same name from above. Again, it asks you to view a person as com-
posed of a set of successive selves, some of whom will have different prefer-
ences from the others. When any one of those selves is called upon to make
a decision, they might be required to take into consideration the preferences
of the others, and to aggregate those preferences with theirs in some way
and use the aggregate preference to make their choice. Let me illustrate





represents an individual’s preferences over outcomes by their utility func-
tion, which assigns to each outcome a number that measures how much
the individual values that outcome. Suppose we represent in this way each
of my selves at different times. Then we might say that, when their turn
comes to have decision-making power—that is, at the time when that self
exists—each should make decisions using an aggregate utility function that
incorporates their own utility function but also the utility functions of my
other selves, albeit to different extents. For instance, we might say that
the aggregate utility function should be a weighted average of the utility
functions of all the selves that make up me. So, in the adoption case, my
current self should decide using a utility function that is obtained by aver-
aging their utility function and the utility functions of my past and future
selves. Thus, the aggregate utility for the outcome in which I adopt is a
weighted average of my current utility for that outcome and the utilities
assigned to it by my past selves and the utilities assigned to it by those of
my future selves that would come into being were I to adopt. This approach
raises the question: what weight should be given to the utilities of the vari-
ous different selves when we produce the aggregate utility function? Does
the current, decision-making self receive more weight than others? Must
all selves receive some possible weight? Even the past selves? Are some
selves worthy of more weight than others, and why?
4 Personal autonomy for changing selves
These, then, are some of the problems that the phenomenon of prefer-
ence change raises for our theorising about rational choice, together with a
sketch of some proposed solutions. In this section, I’d like to describe some
problems it raises for our theorising about autonomy.
The Problem of the Fractured Self. Autonomy is self-authorship. In Kant, this
is understood in an extreme form. To be autonomous, your preferences
must arise directly from the will; they should not be caused by anything
outside that will.20 Later authors do not require so much. Your preferences
might be the result of external influences, such as the society or family in
which you’re raised or your genetic make-up; but autonomy requires that
you would, upon reflection, endorse them. For some, this means that your
first-order preferences are endorsed by your second-order preferences.21
Others, who question why second-order preferences should occupy such
a privileged normative role, understand endorsement differently.22 But,
however we understand it, the phenomenon of changing preferences raises
20See Section 3 of (Kant, 1785 [1997]).
21See (Frankfurt, 1971; Dworkin, 1976, 1988).
22See, for instance, (Raz, 1988; Colburn, 2010).
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a question for such accounts. For such reflective endorsement is surely
determined, at least in part, by some aspect of the individual’s preferences.
And since those change over time, so might the individual’s disposition to
endorse. And so arises the question: at what time must you endorse your
preferences to count as autonomous? At the time at which you have them?
But then the addict will count as autonomous, which some wish to deny. Or
at some other time? But then many people who undergo changes wrought
by transformative experience will fail to count as autonomous, for they will
not, at the earlier time, endorse the preferences that they come to have at the
later time—for instance, I don’t currently endorse the preferences I would
come to have were I to adopt a child.
In general, the phenomenon of changing preferences bolsters what is some-
times called the postmodernist critique of certain accounts of autonomy.23
This critique is directed against those accounts that require a unified, con-
stant self that charts its course through life and that is able to reflect ratio-
nally on the preferences it has at a given time and give a verdict on them.
In a life that contains many changes in preferences, it looks difficult to find
this unified, constant self. The phenomenon of preference change drives us
more towards a view of persons as corporate entities made up of different
selves at different times, often with different preferences. And from that
point of view, some accounts of autonomy founder.
The Problem of the Unit of Autonomy. This last observation leads to a differ-
ent, but related problem: what is the unit of autonomy? Is it the person
as a whole? Or is it the individual selves that constitute that person? Of-
ten, in theorising about autonomy, philosophers draw the distinction be-
tween local and global accounts of autonomy. Local autonomy is a prop-
erty of a person at a particular time in their life, and often more specifically
the choices they make at that time; global autonomy is a property of their
whole life. Perhaps we can apply the same distinction in response to our
question here: selves can be locally autonomous; persons can be globally
autonomous. One problem with this suggestion is that selves might en-
dure for a long time. They need not necessarily be momentary entities, but
might instead last from one change of preferences to another, which might
be a period of years. Another problem is that, even if we say that different
concepts of autonomy apply to selves and to the persons they compose,
we must say which of the two properties corresponding to those concepts
we wish to promote, and if we wish to promote both, which takes prece-
dence when they clash? After all, we study autonomy not merely as an
exercise in conceptual analysis, but because we think that the property of
being autonomous is one that has normative significance in ethics and pol-
itics.
23See (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000, 10-11) and (Benhabib, 1992, Chapter 5).
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The Binding Problem. We see a specific instance of this problem of prece-
dence when we consider the binding solution to the problem of tempta-
tion. According to that, when I foresee that my preferences will change
temporarily in the future as a result of a particular experience, such as log-
ging on to social media or sitting down at a poker table, and I foresee that
I must put myself in that position if I am to have a chance of getting what
I now most want, then I am rationally required or permitted to bind my
future, tempted self so that they cannot choose the outcome that they will
most want. As I spelled it out above, I effect this binding by removing their
favoured option for them—in the social media case, by downloading an
app; in the gambling case, perhaps by telling the gambling house or web-
site not to let me play beyond a certain stage. That is, I remove an action
from the set of those that will be available to my future self. But many the-
orists of autonomy hold that you deplete an individual’s autonomy when
you remove their options—particularly if they are options that they would
have chosen over the others had they been available.24 So, if the unit of
autonomy is the self, then it seems that binding my future selves reduces
their autonomy. If, on the other hand, it is the whole person that is the unit,
then we might still say that they are autonomous, for they have, as a sin-
gle entity, charted their course through life in a way that they will largely
endorse.
5 Political autonomy for changing selves
The Problem of Paternalism. Many liberals prize very highly a society in
which individuals are autonomous; a society whose members are able to
chart their own course through life, pursuing what will satisfy their pref-
erences, at least insofar as they do not thereby frustrate the preferences of
others, and reflecting on those preferences and either endorsing them or
seeking to alter them. Some think that it is compatible with such a goal that
either the government or private companies or citizens seek to alter the de-
cisions of others, sometimes without explicitly telling them that they are
doing this. Such attempts are sometimes called nudges, and they became
popular in some countries over the past twenty years, building on research
in social psychology that showed how effectively to do this.25 For instance,
we know that people are more likely to choose an option when it is placed
first on a list than they are if it is placed lower down. So, a government
might nudge individuals towards choosing a particular option—agreeing
to donate their organs after death, or agreeing to receive the annual ‘flu
shot—by placing that at the top of a list of related alternatives.
24See (Raz, 1988, Chapter 14).
25The locus classicus is (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).
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When are such nudges compatible with the autonomy of the individuals
who are being nudged? Some will say that they are always compatible:
after all, no option has been removed; all are still available, and just as
easily; all that has changed is how the decision is presented. But others will
worry that there are less benign cases. For instance, some might think that
subliminal messaging is not compatible with autonomy.26
One response is to apply what Thaler and Sunstein call the ‘as judged by
themselves’ test. This says that a particular nudge is compatible with au-
tonomy if the person nudged is happy that they were influenced this way
and happy with the decision so made. Thus, while they might be indif-
ferent to the annual ‘flu shot, or perhaps even a little bit against organ do-
nation, it is permissible to nudge them towards both if, after having been
successfully nudged, and after the mechanism by which it was done is laid
out before them, they are happy that they were.
However, as Paul & Sunstein (ms) note in recent work, the phenomenon of
preference change through transformative experience raises problems for
this criterion. Suppose I am dead set against adopting a child. My cur-
rent life, with my close group of friends and my work with the disabled
club, is much more valuable to me now. However, my government very
heavily nudges me towards adopting. And indeed they do so through a
variety of rather sinister and covert methods: subliminal messaging, emo-
tional blackmail, and so on. Finally, I agree to adopt. Over the coming
months, I come to love my adopted child so much that, when the govern-
ment’s psychological techniques are revealed to me, I declare myself happy
that they did this—after all, raising this child is the most important thing in
my life and I wouldn’t have done it otherwise. The government’s nudges
pass the ‘as judged by themselves’ test, but they seem incompatible with
autonomy.
So, the question arises: if the ‘as judged by themselves’ test fails in these
cases, is there a better test available?
6 Conclusion
The phenomenon of changing preferences is varied and widespread. It
has raised a number of challenges for theories of rational choice, and these
have occupied economists, psychologists, and philosophers for a number
of decades. But the challenges that they raise for theories of autonomy have
been less commonly discussed. As we saw, there are a number: the problem
of the fractured self, the problem of the units of autonomy, the binding
problem, and the problem of paternalism. No doubt there are many more.
26See (Dworkin, 1988, 3-20).
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I have sketched the problems here, but I have not offered anything in the
way of solutions. I hope those who concern themselves with the theory of
autonomy will find it worth their time to address them.
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J. L. Bermúdez (Ed.) Self-Control, Decision Theory, and Rationality. Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Pettigrew, R. (2019a). Choosing for Changing Selves. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Pettigrew, R. (2019b). Review of J. L. Bermúdez (ed.) Self-Control, Decision
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